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NOTES 
A LIE IS A LIE: THE NEED TO DEFINE 
SECTION 1692e OF THE FDCPA 
INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, complaints regarding abusive debt collection practices 
have spiked dramatically.1 Even while the tools available to debt collectors 
have changed over the years, abusive practices remain an issue.2 As a result, 
these unfair practices have necessitated government regulation.3 One 
response to the “effort to curtail deceptive, unfair, and abusive debt 
collection practices in the marketplace”4 is the Fair Debt Collection 
Practices Act (FDCPA or the Act).5 These regulations still need refinement, 
and a combination of disagreement among the Circuit Courts and the recent 
transfer of regulatory power from the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) to 
the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB)6 have created an 
opportunity for effective change to the FDCPA. Specifically, Section 1692e 
of the FDCPA needs to be unequivocally defined in order to better protect 
consumer debtors. 
Section 1692e governs misrepresentations made by debt collectors 
during the course of the debt collection process.7 Section I of this note will 
provide a brief overview of consumer credit and debt collection. Section II 
will explore how the recent Seventh Circuit case, O’Rourke v. Palisades 
Acquisition XVI, LLC,8 highlights a circuit split regarding the application of 
Section 1692e and why that split should be resolved broadly in favor of 
consumers. Section III discusses how the recent changes by the Dodd-Frank 
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act) will or 
should affect the interpretation of Section 1692e. Finally, Section IV 
suggests actions for the CFPB to take with respect to the FDCPA in order to 
better protect consumers from abuse while balancing the right of creditors 
and debt collectors to recover monies owed.  
 
                                                                                                                                          
 1. See CFPB, CFPB ANNUAL REPORT 2012: FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT 7 
(2012) [hereinafter ANNUAL REPORT 2012].  
 2. See id. at 4.  
 3. See FTC, ANNUAL REPORT 2011: FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT 1 (2011) 
[hereinafter ANNUAL REPORT 2011]. 
 4. Id.  
 5. Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692–1692p (2006). 
 6. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Financial Protection Act (Dodd-Frank 
Act), Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1089, 124 Stat. 1376, 2092–93 (2010) (codified at various 
subsections of 15 U.S.C. § 1692) (amending the FDCPA by transferring the power to enforce 
compliance with the FDCPA and prescribing rules with respect to the collection of debts from the 
FTC to the CFPB). 
 7. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. 
 8. O’Rourke v. Palisades Acquisition XVI, LLC, 635 F.3d 938 (7th Cir. 2011). 
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I. CONSUMER CREDIT AND DEBT COLLECTION 
A. CONSUMER CREDIT 
For the purposes of this note, “consumer” will refer to the FDCPA 
understanding of “any natural person obligated or allegedly obligated to pay 
any debt.”9 This type of debt is best conceptualized as secured or unsecured 
loans in the form of personal loans, credit cards, auto loans, and 
mortgages.10 These debts are incurred “primarily for personal, family, or 
household purposes” as opposed to corporate or business debt.11 In 
extending credit, the understanding is that a consumer will repay in a timely 
manner.12 This relationship allows the average consumer to significantly 
increase his purchasing power, enabling him to quickly procure capital, 
goods, or services and gradually pay the balance over a period of time.13 
Credit cards, a popular product today, are used for nearly every type of 
daily purchase14 from groceries to cars. In America they have become a 
common replacement for cash,15 with nearly every adult owning one or 
more credit card.16 Related to credit cards, credit plays a softer role in a 
consumer’s life, as credit history and potential income are indicators used to 
determine one’s “credit-worthiness.”17 Credit in turn affects an individual’s 
ability to invest more than his current financial resources might permit.18 
Especially in modern countries, the ability to procure credit and a good 
credit history are as essential to business and life “as rain is to the rice 
field.”19 
However, the flipside of credit is debt, a problem which may be 
aggravated by insolvency and, in unfortunate cases, could end in 
bankruptcy. Specific hardships exist for many consumers who are too poor 
or experience negative life changes and as a result cannot satisfy 
                                                                                                                                          
 9. 15 U.S.C. § 1692(a)(3). 
 10. See, e.g., Todd J. Zywicki, The Economics of Credit Cards, 3 CHAP. L. REV. 79, 120 
(2000). 
 11. Consumer Laws and Regulations: Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 
CONSUMERFINANCE.GOV, http://www.consumerfinance.gov/guidance/supervision/manual/fdcpa 
-narrative/ (last visited Aug. 26 2012). 
 12. Financial illiteracy has resulted in consumers who do not fully comprehend the risks and 
costs of incurring debt, which may be a factor affecting timely payments back to lenders. See 
Tiffany S. Lee, No More Abuse: The Dodd-Frank and Consumer Financial Protection Act’s 
“Abusive” Standard, 14 J. CONSUMER & COM. L. 118, 120 (2011).  
 13. See Zywicki, supra note 10, at 95.  
 14. See id. at 85.  
 15. See id. 
 16. Richard H. Gibson, Credit Card Dischargeability: Two Cheers for the Common Law and 
Some Modest Proposals for Legislative Reform, 74 AM. BANKR. L.J. 129, 129 (2000). 
 17. Phyliss Craig-Taylor, To Be Free: Liberty, Citizenship, Property, and Race, 14 HARV. 
BLACKLETTER L.J. 45, 69 (1998). 
 18. See Margaret M. Blair, Financial Innovation, Leverage, Bubbles and the Distribution of 
Income, 30 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 225, 306 (2010). 
 19. Jennifer J. Rose, The Last Waltz, Redux, GPSOLO, July–Aug. 2011, at 4. 
2012] The Need to Define Section 1692e of the FDCPA 147 
outstanding debts.20 As a last resort, consumers may declare bankruptcy.21 
While this provides consumers with a fresh start, it may adversely affect 
one’s ability to subsequently borrow, rent an apartment, buy a home, secure 
insurance, or even find employment.22 Although these conditions are not 
permanent, bankruptcy follows a consumer for 10 years,23 which can 
significantly hinder any steps one may take towards reestablishing financial 
credibility.24 Certainly, the importance of credit ratings and purchasing 
power in today’s society underscores the need to protect consumers from 
unfair collection practices. 
B. DEBT COLLECTION 
The FDCPA governs the actions of debt collectors with the purpose of 
curbing abusive debt collection practices.25 Under the FDCPA, the term 
“debt collector” refers to any person who regularly collects or attempts to 
collect debts owed to another or who uses a different name when collecting 
his own debts.26 In most instances, the FDCPA tends to focus on the actions 
of third party debt collectors.27 When consumers fail to repay their debts, 
not only do their credit scores suffer, but debt collectors also suffer as they 
must now treat those debts as a loss and “charge-off” their debt,28 selling it 
for pennies on the dollar.29 On a small scale, this may not seem significant, 
but when considered in the aggregate, this translates into hundreds of 
                                                                                                                                          
 20. “[T]he vast majority of consumers who obtain credit fully intend to repay their debts. 
When default occurs, it is nearly always due to an unforeseen event such as unemployment, 
overextension, serious illness, or marital difficulties or divorce.” S. REP. NO. 95-382, at 3 (1977), 
reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1695, 1697. 
 21. Is Consumer Bankruptcy the Right Choice for You?, 73 TEX. B.J. 516 (2010) [hereinafter 
Consumer Bankruptcy]; Improving Credit, FTC.GOV, http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/conline/edcams 
/gettingcredit/improvingcredit.html (last visited Sept. 28, 2011). 
 22. See Improving Credit, supra note 21. 
 23. See Consumer Bankruptcy, supra note 21; Improving Credit, supra note 21 (explaining 
that bankruptcy remains on an individual’s credit report for ten years, while outstanding debts are 
erased after seven years).  
 24. See Ronald S. Orr & James A. McDougal, The Debtor’s View of Chapter 11 in a Case 
Involving Real Property, in REAL ESTATE WORKOUTS AND BANKRUPTCIES 1993, at 91, 143–50 
(Practising Law Institute 1993). 
 25. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692(a) (2006). 
 26. See id. § 1692a(6).  
 27. S. REP. NO. 95-382, at 3 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1695, 1697–98. The 
Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs intended for the FDCPA to apply primarily 
to independent debt collectors. The term “debt collector” was not meant to apply to “in house” 
collectors who use a creditor’s true business name. Instead, it was intended to apply to all third 
parties who regularly collect others’ debts. Id.  
 28. A “charge-off” refers to the process of an original creditor deciding that they will no 
longer make attempts to collect a debt. As a result, the account is “charged-off” and usually sold 
to a third party who specializes in debt collection in bulk for pennies on the dollar. Peter A. 
Holland, The One Hundred Billion Dollar Problem in Small Claims Court: Robo-Signing and 
Lack of Proof in Debt Buyer Cases, 6 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 259, 264–65, 269 (2011). 
 29. Id.  
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millions of dollars in losses for individual creditors.30 Thus, debt collection 
is a way for original creditors to pad their losses either through legal action 
or by charging-off the debt and selling it to a debt buyer who tries to collect 
on debts where the original creditor could not.31 When considered on the 
whole, the sum is staggering: outstanding consumer loans in 2009 totaled 
$2.5 trillion.32 With so much to possibly gain, the debt purchasing industry 
has become a fast-growing financial service sector in recent years, which 
debt collectors33 and debtors have both agreed needs regulation.34 
However, with 1,593,081 bankruptcy petitions filed in 2010 in the 
United States,35 debt collectors today are left with fewer methods to recover 
money due to them.36 Certainly a creditor that lends $5,000 and only 
recovers $1,000 cannot expect to run a profitable lending service. This is 
not the case for all consumer debtors, and insolvent clients are part of the 
risk that a creditor knowingly assumes before choosing to lend.37 In some 
cases, a lender is aware of an individual borrower’s financial constraints 
prior to extending credit.38 Still, the importance of minimizing uncollectable 
debt is significant when considering how a rampant failure to collect debts 
may interfere with a creditor’s ability to continue lending.39 
There are other interests at stake besides a creditor’s personal financial 
well-being. The integral role that creditors and lenders play as financial 
                                                                                                                                          
 30. See id. at 269. In 2010, JPMorgan Chase charged-off 23,000 delinquent accounts valued at 
$200 million. This was sold for 13 cents on the dollar, or $26 million, accounting for $174 million 
in losses due to a failure to collect debts from consumers. Id. 
 31. See id. at 259.  
 32. RICK JURGENS & ROBERT J. HOBBS, NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., THE DEBT MACHINE: 
HOW THE COLLECTION INDUSTRY HOUNDS CONSUMERS AND OVERWHELMS COURTS 5 (2010), 
available at http://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/pr-reports/debt-machine.pdf. 
 33. See id. at 25 (stating, as one debt buyer warned his peers in early 2008, “If we don’t 
regulate ourselves, somebody is going to come in and regulate us for us”).  
 34. See Holland, supra note 28, at 265; see also Michael Rezendes & Francie Latour, No 
Mercy for Consumers, Firms’ Tactics are One Mark of a System that Penalizes Those Who Owe, 
BOSTON GLOBE, July 30, 2006, at A1 (discussing several instances of how debt collectors have 
abused the small claims state court system to satisfy judgments against unsophisticated consumer 
debtors). 
 35. Bankruptcy Statistics, U.S. COURTS, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts 
/Statistics/BankruptcyStatistics/BankruptcyFilings/2010/1210_f2.pdf (last visited Aug. 26, 2012). 
 36. See ANNUAL REPORT 2011, supra note 3, at 1 (stating the FTC has recognized that debt 
collectors have a legitimate interest in collecting debts). 
 37. See Dov Solomon & Odelia Minnes, Non-Recourse, No Down Payment and the Mortgage 
Meltdown: Lessons From Undercapitalization, 16 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 529, 555 (2011); 
First Nat. Bank of Mobile v. Roddenberry, 701 F.2d 927, 932 (11th Cir. 1983) (“Banks are willing 
to risk non-payment of debts because that risk is factored into the finance charges.”). 
 38. Id. 
 39. See generally David Cho, New Crisis Threatens Healthy Banks, WASH. POST, June 22, 
2008, at A1 (noting that in light of the mortgage lending crisis, smaller banks face difficulties in 
continuing their lending practices and operations because debtors are having difficulties making 
payments).  
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risk-bearers40 strengthens the case for protecting creditors’ interests in 
receiving timely payments on debts.41 As a risk-bearer, financial lending 
institutions can support businesses and individuals.42 
One of the most recognizable types of creditors is a bank.43 From the 
2008 financial crisis, we learned that banks, as financial institutions and 
creditors, played a disproportionately large role in our modern economy.44 
The phrase “too big to fail” immortalizes this lesson.45 While the Dodd-
Frank Act seeks to end this dependency on large financial institutions,46 an 
interest remains in protecting the ability to reasonably recover outstanding 
debt. Where banks fail to collect, third party debt collectors make a living. 
A strong case may be made to protect the interests of both consumer 
debtors and creditors engaged in debt collection. Consumers deserve to be 
treated with care and respect and should not be taken advantage of through 
unfair debt collection practices such as harassment, embarrassment, or 
misrepresentation.47 On the other hand, creditors and debt collectors also 
have a recognized interest in recovering monies due to them.48 In an effort 
to balance these competing interests, Congress passed the FDCPA.49 The 
challenge is determining how to improve the FDCPA as it is defined and 
interpreted, in order to provide more effective protections for consumers 
while still respecting the financial interests of creditors. 
II. THE INCREASING PROBLEM OF MISREPRESENTATION 
A. ANNUAL FDCPA COMPLAINT REPORTS 
To improve the FDCPA, it is useful to consider the annual reports on 
the FDCPA that the FTC50 and CFPB51 submit to Congress. These reports 
                                                                                                                                          
 40. Cf. Royce de R. Barondes et al., Twilight in the Zone of Insolvency: Fiduciary Duty and 
Creditors of Troubled Companies, 1 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 229, 238–39 (2007) (noting that some 
courts treat creditors as the residual risk-bearer when firms become insolvent). 
 41. See ANNUAL REPORT 2011, supra note 3, at 1. 
 42. See The Credit Process: A Guide for Small Business Owners, NEWYORKFED.ORG, 
http://newyorkfed.org/education/addpub/credit.html (last visited Sep. 16, 2012) (explaining that 
the New York Federal Reserve Bank provides help for individuals trying to live the “American 
Dream” by offering advice on how to procure financial loans for business enterprises). 
 43. See NationsBank and BankAmerica Close Merger Creating Largest U.S. Bank, PR 
NEWSWIRE (Sept. 30, 1998), http://www.thefreelibrary.com/NationsBank+And+BankAmerica 
+Close+Merger+Creating+Largest+U.S.+Bank.-a053047354. 
 44. See Jonathan R. Macey & James P. Holdcroft, Jr., Failure is an Option: An Ersatz-
Antitrust Approach to Financial Regulation, 120 YALE L.J. 1368, 1376–77 (2011). 
 45. See Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, pmbl., 124 Stat. 1376, 1376 (2010) (stating two 
purposes of the Dodd-Frank Act are to improve the financial system and put an end to institutions 
that are “too big to fail”); see also Macey & Holdcroft, supra note 44, at 1377.  
 46. Dodd-Frank Act, pmbl., 124 Stat. at 1376.  
 47. See S. REP. NO. 95-382, at 1 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1695, 1696. 
 48. See ANNUAL REPORT 2011, supra note 3, at 2.  
 49. See S. REP. NO. 95-382, at 1.  
 50. The FTC is required to annually present a report to Congress regarding its administrative 
functions under the FDCPA. 15 U.S.C. § 1692m(a) (2006). In 2012, this responsibility passed to 
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update Congress on the types of FDCPA complaints the FTC receives52 and 
on any necessary or appropriate recommendations regarding the FDCPA.53 
In 2011, the FTC received over 142,000 complaints, 22.3 percent of which 
were sent directly by consumers regarding third-party debt collectors and 
in-house debt collectors.54 This number has more than doubled in a period 
of five years, as fewer than 70,000 complaints were filed in 2006.55 The 
recent increase in reported debt collection complaints is proof enough that 
the FDCPA is still a necessary shield for consumers. 
From 2007 to 2011, the FTC has placed FDCPA violation complaints 
into several corresponding categories. They include: harassment;56 demands 
for illegally large payments;57 failure to send notice;58 threats for payment;59 
failure to identify self as a debt collector;60 revealing alleged debt to third 
parties;61 placing calls to a consumer’s place of employment;62 failure to 
verify disputed debts;63 and ignoring “cease communication”64 notices.65 
Each year the annual report to Congress largely lists the same complaints.66 
Interestingly, no category focuses explicitly on misrepresentations made to 
a consumer,67 even though the FTC and CFPB68 have noted the significant 
prevalence of debt collectors bringing collection suits based on insufficient 
or false information.69 Misrepresentations cover a wide range of activities,70 
including misrepresentations made to the court in the course of litigation 
                                                                                                                                          
the CFPB. Dodd-Frank Act § 1089, 124 Stat. at 2092 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692k, 1692m, 
1692o).  
 51. ANNUAL REPORT 2012, supra note 1.  
 52. See ANNUAL REPORT 2011, supra note 3, at 3.  
 53. 15 U.S.C. § 1692m(a). 
 54. See ANNUAL REPORT 2012, supra note 1, at 6.  
 55. See FTC, ANNUAL REPORT 2007: FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT 2 (2007) 
[hereinafter ANNUAL REPORT 2007]. 
 56. See, e.g., ANNUAL REPORT 2012, supra note 1, at 8; 15 U.S.C. § 1692d (2006). 
 57. See, e.g., ANNUAL REPORT 2012, supra note 1, at 8; 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e(2), 1692f(1). 
 58. See, e.g., ANNUAL REPORT 2012, supra note 1, at 8; 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a). 
 59. See, e.g., ANNUAL REPORT 2012, supra note 1, at 9; 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e(4)–(5). 
 60. See, e.g., ANNUAL REPORT 2012, supra note 1, at 9; 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e(11), d(6). 
 61. See, e.g., ANNUAL REPORT 2012, supra note 1, at 9; 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(b). 
 62. See, e.g., ANNUAL REPORT 2012, supra note 1, at 9; 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(a)(3) (2006). 
 63. See, e.g., ANNUAL REPORT 2012, supra note 1, at 10; 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(b). 
 64. See, e.g., ANNUAL REPORT 2012, supra note 1, at 10; 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(c). 
 65. See ANNUAL REPORT 2012, supra note 1, at 7.  
 66. See id.; ANNUAL REPORT 2011, supra note 3, at 6–9; FTC, ANNUAL REPORT 2010: FAIR 
DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT 5–10 (2010); FTC, ANNUAL REPORT 2009: FAIR DEBT 
COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT 6–10 (2009); FTC, ANNUAL REPORT 2008: FAIR DEBT 
COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT 5–8 (2008); ANNUAL REPORT 2007, supra note 55, at 2–7.  
 67. See ANNUAL REPORT 2012, supra note 1, at 6. There are, however, categories that focus 
on forms of misrepresentation such as false threats made to induce payment. See id. at 9. 
  68. Id. at 4.  
  69. Consent Decree at 4, U.S. v. Asset Acceptance, LLC, No. 8:12-cv-182-T-27 (M.D. Fla. 
Jan. 30, 2012) (detailing a debt collector’s $2.5 million settlement with the FTC for collection 
attempts based on improper information, illustrating an agency regulating as opposed to a con-
sumer exercising his right to sue under the FDCPA). 
 70. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692e (2006). 
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through pleadings. While misstatements made out of court are covered by 
Section 1692e, the statute’s application to misstatements and 
misrepresentations made in court is difficult to interpret because of 
disagreement between the Sixth and Seventh Circuits. 
B. SECTION 1692e OF THE FDCPA GOVERNS MISREPRESENTATIONS 
Section 1692e states that “[a] debt collector may not use any false, 
deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the 
collection of any debt.”71 This Section provides protections to debtors from 
deceptive conduct, and is especially beneficial since many debtors are not 
familiar with their legal rights72 or with the credit industry in general, and 
sometimes struggle with financial literacy.73 
This raises two questions: (1) which parties are liable under Section 
1692e; and (2) at what point does a consumer have standing to sue under 
Section 1692e? The first issue has already been settled by the Supreme 
Court.74 In Heintz v. Jenkins, the Supreme Court expanded the FDCPA’s 
application from only debt collectors to include lawyers who regularly 
engage in debt collection.75 The Supreme Court in Heintz held that the 
FDCPA’s “definition of the term ‘debt collector’ includes a person ‘who 
regularly collects or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed 
[to] . . . another.’”76 Accordingly, lawyers who regularly try to collect 
consumer debts, usually on behalf of a debt collector, are also subject to the 
FDCPA as “debt collectors.”77 Thus, the FDCPA and Section 1692e make 
both debt collectors and their attorneys potentially liable for violations. 
The second issue—the scope of Section 1692e—is less clear. There is a 
Circuit Court split regarding the interpretation and application of Section 
1692e with respect to which parties a debt collector is prohibited from 
making misrepresentations. The Seventh Circuit tends to interpret the 
misrepresentation subdivision narrowly, restricting remedies to 
communications directly made to the consumer and “those who stand in 
their shoes.”78 However, the Sixth and Eighth Circuits follow a broader 
application of Section 1692e, extending it to cover misrepresentations made 
                                                                                                                                          
 71. Id.  
 72. See BUILDING THE CFPB, A PROGRESS REPORT 10 (2011) [hereinafter BUILDING THE 
CFPB], available at http://www.consumerfinance.gov/wp-content/uploads/2011/07/Report 
_BuildingTheCfpb1.pdf. 
 73. See Jeffrey T. Dinwoodie, Ignorance is Not Bliss: Financial Illiteracy, the Mortgage 
Market Collapse, and the Global Economic Crisis, 18 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 181, 182, 184–85 
(2010). 
 74. See Heintz v. Jenkins, 514 U.S. 291, 292 (1995). 
 75. See id.  
 76. Id. at 293 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1692(a)(6) (2006)).  
 77. See id. (noting that even “litigating . . . seems simply one way of collecting a debt”).  
 78. See O’Rourke v. Palisades Acquisition XVI, LLC, 635 F.3d 938, 943 (7th Cir. 2011). 
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to other third parties as well.79 While there are reasons in support of both 
Circuits’ opinions, the Sixth Circuit’s position should apply instead of the 
Seventh Circuit’s. 
III. SECTION 1692e SHOULD BE READ BROADLY 
A. HARTMAN AND O’ROURKE: CIRCUIT SPLIT BETWEEN THE SIXTH 
AND SEVENTH CIRCUITS 
The Sixth Circuit in Hartman v. Great Seneca Financial Group and the 
Seventh Circuit in O’Rourke v. Palisades Acquisition XVI, LLC differ in 
their application of Section 1692e of the FDCPA. Yet, the facts in both 
cases are very similar. In each case, a third party debt collector sued a 
consumer in state court for the recovery of a purchased debt.80 In the initial 
pleadings, both debt collectors attempted to mislead the court by attaching 
to their complaints documents that appeared to look like credit card account 
statements but in fact were not.81 The consumers in both cases brought 
claims against the debt collector for violations of Section 1692e,82 alleging 
that the debt collectors had violated the prohibition against “[t]he use of any 
false representation or deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect any 
debt.”83 However, these cases differ in their outcomes. 
In Hartman, it seems the Sixth Circuit would have allowed recovery 
under Section 1692e.84 However, the issue was remanded for a 
determination of whether the exhibit attached to the debt collector’s 
pleading was misleading.85 For the Hartman court, there was no issue of 
standing, only that a suit would be successful as long as deception was in 
fact involved. Therefore, it would seem that, in the Sixth Circuit, statements 
made during litigation fall within the scope of Section 1692e.86 The court in 
Hartman interpreted “any false representation or deceptive means to collect 
. . . any debt”87 to encompass misleading acts directed at a court because 
                                                                                                                                          
 79. See Hemmingsen v. Messerli, 674 F.3d 814, 818 (8th Cir. 2012); Hartman v. Great Seneca 
Fin. Corp., 569 F.3d 606, 613 (6th Cir. 2009). 
 80. See O’Rourke, 635 F.3d at 943; Hartman, 569 F.3d at 609.  
 81. See O’Rourke, 635 F.3d at 939; Hartman, 569 F.3d at 612.  
 82. See O’Rourke, 635 F.3d at 941; Hartman, 569 F.3d at 610–11.  
 83. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e (2006); O’Rourke, 635 F.3d at 941; Hartman, 569 F.3d at 610–11. 
 84. Hartman, 569 F.3d at 613, 618.  
 85. Id. at 618. While Hartman does not explicitly state that Section 1692e would apply, neither 
the majority, concurrence, or dissent took issue with Section 1692e’s applicability. Further, the 
concurrence in O’Rourke notes that O’Rourke’s majority opinion—placing the debtor there 
outside of Section 1692e’s scope—is directly at odds with Hartman. O’Rourke, 635 F.3d at 949 
(“Restricting our understanding of the FDCPA . . . puts us at loggerheads with some of our sister 
circuits.” (citing Hartman, 569 F.3d at 610, 612)).  
 86. Hartman, 569 F.3d at 616 (citing Heintz v. Jenkins, 514 U.S. 291, 294 (1995)).  
 87. 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e) (2006). 
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statements made by the attorney for a debt collector also fall within the 
scope of the FDCPA.88 
In contrast, the Seventh Circuit in O’Rourke held that the debt 
collector’s use of a document to mislead the judge, while a “dubious 
method” to collect debts, did not fall within the scope of Section 1692e.89 
The Seventh Circuit decided that the scope of Section 1692e was limited to 
misrepresentations directly made to a consumer or someone who “stand[s] 
in the shoes of the consumer.”90 While there is a consensus that the FDCPA 
exists to protect consumers from unfair collection practices by debt 
collectors,91 the circuits are “at loggerheads” as to the application of Section 
1692e.92 In order to fulfill the purpose of the FDCPA “to promote 
consistent State action to protect consumers against debt collection abuses,” 
it is necessary to resolve this dispute.93 
B. APPELLATE COURT SUPPORT FOR A NARROW READING 
A string of circuit opinions have paved the way for the Seventh 
Circuit’s holding in O’Rourke. Several circuits interpret Section 1692e as 
applying only to the actual consumer and “those who stand in their 
shoes.”94 This definition includes the consumer and those who have the 
same authority to receive communications and to act on the consumer’s 
behalf.95 However, misstatements made to a judge were not discussed in 
this initial definition. That question was addressed in 2007 by the Eighth 
Circuit in Volden v. Innovative Financial Systems, Inc. The Eighth Circuit 
interpreted Section 1692e narrowly by placing a definite outer limit on the 
scope of Section 1692e by holding that misleading representations that were 
made to a third party in connection with the collection of a debt for a 
bounced check, did not give the debtor check-writer standing to sue under 
Section 1692e.96 The next year, protection was limited to only certain cases 
                                                                                                                                          
 88. See Heintz, 514 U.S. at 294.  
 89. See O’Rourke, 635 F.3d at 940–41. 
 90. See id. at 944.  
 91. See id. at 941; Hartman, 569 F.3d at 611. 
 92. O’Rourke, 635 F.3d at 949 (Tinder, J., concurring).  
 93. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e (2006). 
 94. O’Rourke, 635 F.3d at 943 (majority opinion); see Guerrero v. RJM Acquisitions, LLC, 
499 F.3d 926, 935 (9th Cir. 2007); Volden v. Innovative Fin. Sys., Inc., 440 F.3d 947, 954–55 (8th 
Cir. 2006); Wright v. Fin. Serv. of Norwalk, Inc., 22 F.3d 647, 650 (6th Cir. 1994). 
 95. Wright, 22 F.3d at 650. 
 96. See Volden, 440 F.3d at 954–55. In this case, the plaintiff Volden wrote several checks that 
bounced. Id. at 949–50. Defendant IFS insured merchants against bounced checks and attempted 
to collect the balance for the bad checks from Volden. Id. Volden alleged that in the process of 
collection, IFS made a contractually false representation to their insurer, EFT. Id. at 950. After 
paying the balance of the bounced checks, Volden sued IFS for a violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e 
for making a misrepresentation to EFT that was “in connection with” the collection of his debt. Id. 
The Circuit Court refused to grant Volden’s petition and ruled in favor of IFS, stating that for 
recovery, EFT had to sue IFS and that misrepresentations made to a third party are not actionable 
by the debtor. See id. at 953–55. While the court did not make this explicit, there seems to have 
154 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. [Vol. 7 
where misstatements were made to a consumer’s attorney.97 The Ninth 
Circuit applied a higher standard of review when attorneys are involved 
because an attorney stands a significantly lower chance of being bullied or 
taken advantage of as compared to his client.98 These decisions culminated 
in the Seventh Circuit’s decision in O’Rourke—false representations made 
to a judge in a state court are not protected under Section 1692e99 because 
“[t]he statute is designed to provide information that helps consumers to 
choose intelligently.”100 
C. SUPPORT FOR A BROAD READING 
1. Appellate Court Support for a Broad Reading 
There have also been gradual changes throughout the circuits 
suggesting that a broader interpretation of Section 1692e is appropriate. The 
Sixth Circuit defines the term “consumer” to include “the consumer’s 
spouse, parent (if the consumer is a minor), guardian, executor, or 
administrator”101 as well as the executrix of a consumer’s estate.102 
Accordingly, a violation of the FDCPA “need not offend the alleged debtor 
before there is a violation of the provision.”103 In 1995, the Supreme Court 
                                                                                                                                          
been some equitable considerations taken by the court. Volden wrote bad checks, and IFS 
properly tried to recover the balance for those checks but happened to make a contractual error 
that seemingly amounted to a legal misrepresentation. See id. at 949–50. There did not appear to 
be evidence of malice on IFS’s part. In all, Volden seems to have been motivated by less than 
upstanding reasons in bringing this suit against IFS. Given these considerations, the Circuit Court 
acted equitably; however, in doing so, the court seemingly grasped for any justification to dispute 
Volden’s claims. Yet, Volden’s claims have some merit. Following a plain reading of the text of 
Section 1692e, “[a] debt collector may not use any . . . misleading representation . . . in connection 
with the collection of any debt.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. The statute permits representations to be 
made to anyone. In fact, the text uses the word “any” which would suggest a broad interpretation, 
one that would certainly include misrepresentations made to third parties in pursuit of the 
collection of a debt. However, Volden was distinguished by Hemmingsen, which expanded on the 
Volden decision, stating “We are unwilling to adopt the district court’s broad ruling that false 
statements not made directly to a consumer debtor are never actionable under § 1692e. No other 
court has read the statute that narrowly.” Hemmingsen v. Messerli, 674 F.3d 814, 818 (8th Cir. 
2012). 
 97. See Guerrero, 499 F.3d at 935. The defendant debt collector, RJM, was accused, among 
other things, of making a false misrepresentation to the petitioner’s attorney in connection with the 
collection of a debt. Id. at 929. The court held a letter containing a misrepresentation that is sent to 
the debtor’s attorney will not be treated as a misrepresentation made to the debtor himself. Id. at 
929. Attorneys are held to a higher standard than the “least sophisticated consumer” standard for 
consumers. Id. at 929, 934–35.  
 98. See id. at 935.  
 99. O’Rourke, 635 F.3d at 943.  
 100. Hahn v. Triumph P’ships LLC, 557 F.3d 755, 757 (7th Cir. 2009) (emphasis added). 
 101. 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(d) (2006). 
 102. See Wright v. Fin. Serv. of Norwalk, Inc., 22 F.3d 647, 650 (6th Cir. 1994) (finding that 
misleading debt collection letters sent posthumously to the debtor were actionable by the executrix 
of the estate of the debtor). 
 103. Id. at 649.  
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extended the application of the FDCPA to include attorneys who regularly 
represent debt collectors or who themselves regularly engage in debt 
collection practices.104 As a result, the application of Section 1692e has also 
been broadened to include communications made in a court setting because 
“a complaint served directly on a consumer to facilitate debt-collection 
efforts is a communication subject” to Section 1692e.105 Further, deceptive 
state pleadings have been argued to be covered by the FDCPA’s “rule 
against trickery,” which violates Section 1692e.106 
Additionally, the FTC has identified four major concerns that the 
FDCPA should address regarding debt collection litigation.107 The most 
relevant of these is a “finding that the complaints filed in debt collection 
suits often do not contain sufficient information to allow consumers . . . to 
admit or deny the allegations.”108 This suggests that the FTC intended for 
the FDCPA to apply to litigation as well as to communications with 
consumers.109 Other courts have supported this finding as the application of 
the FDCPA to litigation conduct has been upheld in four different 
circuits.110 
Following the trend to broaden the application of Section 1692e, the 
Sixth Circuit decided Hartman by creating the potential to extend its scope 
to in-court pleadings.111 If the FDCPA covers attorneys who also regularly 
                                                                                                                                          
 104. See Heintz v. Jenkins, 514 U.S. 291, 299 (1995). 
 105. Donohue v. Quick Collect Inc., 592 F.3d 1027, 1031–32 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 106. See Appellant’s Reply Brief at 3, 18, O’Rourke v. Palisades Acquisition XVI, LLC, 635 
F.3d 938 (7th Cir. 2011) (No. 08 C 00430). 
 107. The FTC considered four policy topics: “(1) debt collection litigation and arbitration 
proceedings; (2) the collection of decedents’ debts; (3) the debt buying industry; and (4) 
technological changes.” ANNUAL REPORT 2011, supra note 3, at 15.  
 108. Id. at 16.  
 109. See FTC, COLLECTING CONSUMER DEBTS: THE CHALLENGES OF CHANGE, A WORKSHOP 
REPORT 58 (2009), available at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/workshops/debtcollection/dcwr.pdf 
(stating that the FTC “may take law enforcement action to address debt collection litigation 
activities to the extent that they violate the FDCPA”). 
 110. See Appellant’s Reply Brief, supra note 106, at 20; see also Hartman v. Great Seneca Fin. 
Corp., 569 F.3d 606, 612–13 (6th Cir. 2009) (holding there was a “genuine issue of material fact” 
whether a document the debt collector attached to its complaint would mislead the “least 
sophisticated consumer” under the FDCPA); Sayyed v. Wolpoff & Abramson, 485 F.3d 226, 232–
34 (4th Cir. 2007) (applying Congress’ and the Supreme Court’s clear intent to apply the FDCPA 
to litigation activities of attorneys acting as debt collectors); Todd v. Weltman, Weinberg & Reis 
Co., 434 F.3d 432, 439, 446 (6th Cir. 2006) (applying the FDCPA to a law firm’s executing and 
filing of misleading affidavits); Goldman v. Cohen, 445 F.3d 152, 155 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding that 
“a consumer debt collector’s initiation of a lawsuit in state court seeking recovery of unpaid 
consumer debts is an ‘initial communication’ within the meaning of the FDCPA”); Picht v. Jon R. 
Hawks, Ltd., 236 F.3d 446, 451 (8th Cir. 2001) (applying the FDCPA to a debt collector’s claim 
on worthless checks that resulted in wage garnishment of the debtor); Fox v. Citicorp Credit 
Services, Inc., 15 F.3d 1507, 1513 (9th Cir. 1994) (finding that an attorney who filed an 
application for a writ of garnishment fell within the FDCPA definition of “debt collector”). 
 111. See Hartman, 569 F.3d at 613 (noting that if there was a finding of deception, then there 
would be a cause of action under Section 1692e without having to reach the issue of whether to 
extend the scope of Section 1692e). 
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engage in debt collection because of their important role in the collection of 
a debt,112 then Section 1692e should also apply when a misrepresentation is 
made to a party who plays a significant role in the collection of a debt. 
During litigation, the conversation is no longer between the debt collector 
and the consumer, but a third party—the judge—has also been introduced 
to the conversation as a finder of fact. Because both the consumer and the 
judge play vital roles in the resolution of a debt collection suit, a 
misrepresentation to either party may significantly affect the outcome of 
that suit. If a debt collector makes a misrepresentation to recover a debt, it 
should not matter whether the debtor, his attorney, or the presiding judge is 
deceived so long as that deception results in an improper recovery at the 
consumer’s expense. Unfortunately, this is precisely where the Seventh 
Circuit drew the line in O’Rourke.113 
2. Statutory Support for a Broad Reading 
In addition to the trend among some courts to broaden the scope of 
Section 1692e, the plain language and purpose of the FDCPA also support 
this position. The FDCPA is not meant to be restricted to consumers but 
should apply to the “gullible as well as the shrewd.”114 The purpose of the 
FDCPA is “to eliminate abusive debt collection practices by debt 
collectors,”115 and Section 1692e accomplishes this by prohibiting debt 
collectors from “us[ing] any false, deceptive, or misleading representation 
or means in connection with the collection of any debt.”116 Certainly, suing 
a debtor is one means of debt collection; indeed, the Supreme Court has 
observed that “litigating . . . seems simply one way of collecting a debt.”117 
This is especially so within the court system as documents submitted to the 
court are also served on opposing counsel.118 Therefore, it is a reasonable 
inference that information conveyed by a debt collector to a court will also 
be conveyed to the defending consumer because courts are a “medium 
through which debt collection information is conveyed to consumers.”119 
Assuming this, then misleading documents submitted to a court would also 
                                                                                                                                          
 112. See Heintz v. Jenkins, 514 U.S. 291, 299 (1995). 
 113. See O’Rourke v. Palisades Acquisition XVI, LLC, 635 F.3d 943 (7th Cir. 2011). 
 114. Clomon v. Jackson, 988 F.2d 1314, 1318 (2d Cir. 1993). 
 115. 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e) (2006); Muha v. Encore Receivable Mgmt., Inc., 558 F.3d 623, 627 
(7th Cir. 2009) (“The purpose of the Fair Debt Collection Practice Act is to protect consumers . . . 
.”). 
 116. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. 
 117. Heintz, 514 U.S. at 297; Donohue v. Quick Collect Inc., 592 F.3d 1027, 1032 (9th Cir. 
2010) (quoting Heintz, 514 U.S. at 297). 
 118. FED. R. CIV. P. 5(a). 
 119. O’Rourke v. Palisades Acquisition XVI, LLC, 635 F.3d 938, 949 (7th Cir. 2011) (Tinder, 
J., concurring). 
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be conveyed to a defendant consumer and should constitute a 
misrepresentation to the judge and consumer.120 
With regards to the scope of protection under Section 1692e, the 
FDCPA is at best broad and at worst silent. However, in looking at the 
legislative history of the FDCPA, Congress rejected a proposal to place 
“litigation activities” beyond the scope of the FDCPA.121 The Supreme 
Court believes that, “litigation activities” refers to in-court activities by 
attorneys of a legal nature (e.g., submitting petitions).122 Section 1692e 
“do[es] not designate any class of persons, such as lawyers, who can be 
abused, misled, etc., by debt collectors with impunity.”123 Thus, while the 
FDCPA was enacted to protect consumers,124 it does not specify which 
parties the abuse of whom would constitute a harm to consumers.125 
Conversely, the language of the FDCPA does not exempt judges from 
Section 1692e considerations.126 
Instead, the FDCPA is steeped in broad language so as to provide 
consumers with the most protection reasonable.127 The FDCPA applies to 
any debt collector who fails to abide by any of the FDCPA’s provisions 
“with respect to any person.”128 Under the FDCPA, any violators are liable 
to that person.129 Read literally, this means that any debt collector subject to 
the FDCPA is civilly liable to any person130 notwithstanding the non-
exhaustive enumerations in Section 1692c of the FDCPA.131 The repeated 
usage of the term “any” throughout the statute and its purpose of providing 
a wide shield for consumers suggests that it should be interpreted broadly 
and applied to misrepresentations made to judges. 
3. Direct and Indirect Communication 
Misrepresentations should be actionable under Section 1692e regardless 
of whether they were made through direct or indirect communications with 
                                                                                                                                          
 120. See id.  
 121. Heintz, 514 U.S. at 298. “[Congress] proposed alternative language designed to keep 
litigation activities outside the Act’s scope, but that language was not enacted.” Id.  
 122. See id. at 297–98.  
 123. Evory v. RJM Acquisitions Funding LLC, 505 F.3d 769, 773 (7th Cir. 2007). 
 124. 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e) (2006); Muha v. Encore Receivable Mgmt., Inc., 558 F.3d 623, 628 
(7th Cir. 2009) (“The purpose of the Fair Debt Collection Practice Act is to protect consumers . . . 
. ”). 
 125. See Evory, 505 F.3d at 773.  
 126. See O’Rourke v. Palisades Acquisition XVI, LLC, 635 F.3d 938, 941 (7th Cir. 2011) 
(majority opinion) (“[Section 1692]’s language is not specifically limited to statements directed at 
consumers.”). 
 127. E.g., Wright v. Fin. Serv. of Norwalk, Inc., 22 F.3d 647, 649 (6th Cir. 1994) (citing Riveria 
v. MAB Collections, Inc., 682 F.Supp. 174, 175 (W.D.N.Y. 1988)) (noting liability under the 
FDCPA is “couched in the broadest possible language”). 
 128. 15 U.S.C. § 1692k. 
 129. Id.  
 130. Wright, 22 F.3d at 649–50.  
 131. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(d). 
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the consumer. The Seventh Circuit would restrict this to direct 
statements.132 However, a debt collector may communicate with a consumer 
either directly or indirectly.133 It is important to note that “[t]he FDCPA . . . 
defines a ‘communication’ expansively,”134 and even in the Seventh Circuit, 
indirect communications where statements are made to a consumer’s 
attorney are actionable.135 Yet, the Seventh Circuit approach to enforcement 
restricts itself to harms resulting from direct communications with a debt 
collector.136 While both the Seventh and Sixth Circuits have agreed that the 
FDCPA is “designed to provide information that helps consumers to choose 
intelligently,”137 the Seventh Circuit cabins Section 1692e to only those 
misleading statements that could influence a consumer’s decision.138 In 
doing so, the Seventh Circuit in O’Rourke refused to extend Section 1692e 
to cover false representations made indirectly to a consumer by a judge in 
state court.139 
The Seventh Circuit in O’Rourke held that “[j]udges do not have a 
special relationship with consumers” in the same way as an executor or 
attorney.140 This is because judges do not “stand in the consumer’s 
shoes.”141 However, such a standard is too restrictive to fulfill the FDCPA’s 
purpose of protecting consumers.142 O’Rourke fails to recognize that 
communications may be harmful if delivered directly or indirectly. And 
even if a state court pleading is not directly aimed at a consumer, it 
ultimately works to cause deception by the lawyer.143 If a judge decides the 
outcome of a case, then deceiving the finder of fact has a very direct effect 
on the consumer. The court in O’Rourke also overlooked the fact that the 
debt collector submitted a misleading document while attempting to collect 
a debt in state court.144 Therefore, the debt collector used deceptive means 
in an attempt to collect a debt, which patently violates Section 1692e(10)’s 
prohibition against “[t]he use of any false representation or deceptive means 
                                                                                                                                          
 132. O’Rourke v. Palisades Acquisition XVI, LLC, 635 F.3d 938, 943 (7th Cir. 2011).  
 133. See Allen ex rel. Martin v. LaSalle Bank, N.A., 629 F.3d 364, 368 (3d Cir. 2011). 
 134. Id.  
 135. Id.; Evory v. RJM Acquisitions Funding LLC, 505 F.3d 769, 773 (7th Cir. 2007). 
 136. O’Rourke, 635 F.3d at 944. 
 137. Id. at 942; Donohue v. Quick Collect, Inc., 592 F.3d 1027, 1033 (9th Cir. 2010); see also 
Miller v. Javitch, Block & Rathbone, 561 F.3d 588, 596 (6th Cir. 2009). 
 138. O’Rourke, 635 F.3d at 942; see also Hahn v. Triumph P’Ships LLC, 557 F.3d 755, 757–58 
(7th Cir. 2009). 
 139. O’Rourke, 635 F.3d at 943–44 (finding that the Seventh Circuit draws the line for 
application of Section 1692e at “communications directed at consumers . . . and those who stand 
in their shoes”). 
 140. Id. at 944.  
 141. Id.  
 142. See id. at 943. 
 143. See Richard K. Burke, Truth in Lawyering: An Essay on Lying and Deceit in the Practice 
of Law, 38 ARK. L. REV. 1, 5 (1984). 
 144. See O’Rourke, 635 F.3d at 940–41.  
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to collect or attempt to collect any debt or to obtain information concerning 
a consumer.”145 
In contrast, the Sixth Circuit’s view on misrepresentations does not stop 
outside of the courthouse.146 The Sixth Circuit in Hartman takes the next 
logical step by recognizing that a consumer’s decisions may be affected 
even after litigation has commenced.147 A consumer is constantly evaluating 
what decisions to make once a debt collector begins collection attempts. 
Before litigation, a consumer considers whether she believes that the debt 
collector could prevail in a court of law,148 whether threats of litigation are 
real,149 and whether she should make the requested lump sum payment to 
the debt collector. After litigation commences, the consumer must then 
consider whether she should continue fighting the case or whether she 
should settle.150 These later considerations are affected by the perceived 
strength of the debt collector’s case, and if a misleading document that 
resembles the consumer’s outstanding credit card statement is attached to 
the debt collector’s complaint, then that may indirectly cause the debt 
collector’s case to appear stronger than it is in actuality.151 This was the 
scenario in both O’Rourke152 and in Hartman.153 The Sixth Circuit in 
Hartman correctly interpreted the spirit of the FDCPA and provided the 
consumers in that case with a potential remedy for this violation.154 In 
keeping with the FDCPA’s purpose of protecting consumers from any 
misleading representations made in the course of collecting a debt,155 direct 
and indirect communications would appear equally important. 
D. CONSEQUENCES OF A NARROW INTERPRETATION 
1. Contradiction of the FDCPA’s Purpose of Allowing 
Consumers to Act as Private Attorneys General 
The FDCPA was enacted in order to allow consumers to enforce 
violations of the Act instead of having to rely on a government agency to 
intervene on the consumer’s behalf.156 Government enforcement of any 
                                                                                                                                          
 145. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(10) (2006) (emphasis added). 
 146. See Hartman v. Great Seneca Fin. Corp., 569 F.3d 606, 616 (6th Cir. 2009). 
 147. See id.  
 148. See Carol L. Schlitt, Should I Settle My Lawsuit?, NYLAWTHOUGHTS.COM (Mar. 18, 
2011), http://nylawthoughts.com/2011/03/18/should-i-settle-my-lawsuit/. 
 149. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(5). 
 150. See Ted Janger, Crystals and Mud in Bankruptcy Law: Judicial Competence and Statutory 
Design, 43 ARIZ. L. REV. 559, 581 (2001). 
 151. See O’Rourke v. Palisades Acquisition XCI, LLC, 635 F.3d 938, 939–41 (7th Cir. 2011); 
Hartman, 569 F.3d at 612. 
 152. See O’Rourke, 635 F.3d at 939–41.  
 153. See Hartman, 569 F.3d at 612.  
 154. See id. at 613.  
 155. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692e (2006). 
 156. See id. § 1692k. 
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statute can be a costly task, requiring enormous amounts of resources.157 
With this in mind, Congress decided to provide individual citizens with a 
private cause of action to protect their own rights against unfair debt 
collection practices.158 By allowing consumers to act as “private attorneys 
general,”159 the FDCPA promotes several interests. First, the FDCPA 
rewards citizens for educating themselves about their rights against debt 
collectors. Second, it forces debt collectors to exercise more caution and 
care when collecting debts, as they not only have to worry about the 
CFPB,160 but also consumers bringing claims against them for FDCPA 
violations.161 Third, when citizens assert their own rights in private civil 
claims, it alleviates the burden on the CFPB to closely monitor minor debt 
collectors, allowing the CFPB to focus on large-scale FDCPA violations by 
bigger debt collectors.162 Last, this empowers consumers by promoting 
communication between debt collectors and consumers. The result should 
be a future where consumers are more aware of their rights and ready to 
bring claims to enforce those rights, and where debt collectors are 
incentivized to collect debts in a more equitable fashion. Providing 
consumers with a cause of action under Section 1692e for 
misrepresentations made to a court promotes these interests by enabling 
consumers to protect their own rights without having to depend on external 
remedies such as enforcement by the CFPB or court sanctions. 
2. A Small Section’s Big Impact 
Section 1692e is admittedly a small section when contrasted with the 
numerous regulations imposed by the FDCPA.163 However, a narrow 
                                                                                                                                          
 157. Paul V. Timmins, Divestiture as a Remedy in Private Actions Brought Under Section 16 of 
the Clayton Act, Note, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1579, 1595 (1986). 
 158. 15 U.S.C. § 1692k. 
 159. Jacobson v. Healthcare Fin. Servs., Inc., 516 F.3d 85, 91 (2d Cir. 2008) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 160. 15 U.S.C. § 1692l, amended by Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1089, 124 Stat. 
1376, 2092 (2010) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1692l). 
 161. 15 U.S.C. § 1692k. 
 162. Congress extolled the value of citizen-initiated law enforcement when enacting the Civil 
Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976: 
 
The effective enforcement of Federal civil rights statutes depends largely on the efforts 
of private citizens. Although some agencies of the United States have civil rights 
responsibilities, their authority and resources are limited. In many instances where these 
laws are violated, it is necessary for the citizen to initiate court action to correct the 
illegality. 
 
H.R. REP. NO. 94-1558, at 1 (1976); see also Bryant Garth, Ilene H. Nagel & S. Jay Plager, The 
Institution of the Private Attorney General: Perspectives from an Empirical Study of Class Action 
Litigation, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 353, 361 (1988). 
 163. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692–1692o. 
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application of this section has the potential to place substantial and wide-
spread burdens on consumer debtors in several ways. 
First, adopting the Seventh Circuit’s view that Section 1692e should not 
apply to pleadings submitted to a state court exposes consumers to potential 
abuses with little hope of remedy notwithstanding the FDCPA’s purpose of 
giving consumers a greater ability to bring actions against third party debt 
collectors. Congress enacted the FDCPA with the expectation that 
consumers, as very interested parties, would privately enforce violations of 
the FDCPA.164 While the CFPB is permitted to take regulatory action,165 the 
goal of passing the FDCPA was that private civil suits by consumers would 
make it a “primarily self-enforcing” piece of legislation.166 Therefore, it is 
essential that consumers be permitted to enforce this right and not have to 
wait on a third party to champion their cause.167 The alternative is a 
toothless regulatory act that does little to incentivize debt collectors to curb 
abusive debt collection practices.168 
Narrowly interpreting Section 1692e would cut off a consumer’s 
remedy in cases such as O’Rourke where a misrepresentation has been 
made in court.169 Instead, the consumer would be forced to depend on the 
court to use its discretion under Rule 11170 (or the respective state’s 
equivalent to Rule 11) to deal with any misrepresentations made by a debt 
collector.171 In cases where the court does not find a violation or chooses to 
not impose a sanction, a consumer would benefit from having a private 
cause of action under the FDCPA. A narrow interpretation of Section 1692e 
would take this private cause of action away from consumers, effectively 
                                                                                                                                          
 164. S. REP. NO. 95-382, at 5 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1695, 1699. 
 165. 15 U.S.C. § 1692l, amended by Dodd-Frank Act § 1089, 124 Stat. at 2092 (codified at 
various subsections of 15 U.S.C. § 1692l).  
 166. S. REP. NO. 95-382, at 5. 
 167. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Controlling Fraud Against the Government: The Need for 
Decentralized Enforcement, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 995, 1014 (1983). 
 168. See Weiss v. Regal Collections, 385 F.3d 337, 345 (3d Cir. 2004). 
 169. See O’Rourke v. Palisades Acquisition XVI, LLC, 635 F.3d 938, 939 (7th Cir. 2011). 
 170. The usage of the word “may” in Rule 11(c) gives judges discretionary power to impose 
sanctions. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c). 
 171. Rule 11(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states the following: 
(b) Representations to the Court. By presenting to the court a pleading, written motion, 
or other paper—whether by signing, filing, submitting, or later advocating it—an 
attorney or unrepresented party certifies that to the best of the person’s knowledge, 
information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances: 
(1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass, cause 
unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost of litigation [and] . . . (3) the factual 
contentions have evidentiary support . . . . 
FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b). 
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undermining the FDCPA’s purpose of protecting consumers by eliminating 
abusive and deceptive debt collection practices.172 
Second, limiting the scope of Section 1692e will also counter the spirit 
of the Supreme Court’s decision in Heintz v. Jenkins to provide further 
protections to consumers from debt collectors who would use their 
attorneys as hired guns to avoid liability under Section 1692e.173 For years, 
debt collectors have side-stepped regulations imposed by the FDCPA by 
having their attorneys act in their stead.174 In response, the Supreme Court 
decided to definitively extend the application of the FDCPA to include both 
debt collectors and attorneys representing or acting as debt collectors.175 
One goal in this case was to protect consumers by preventing debt 
collectors from abusing the attorney exception by using hired attorneys to 
commit FDCPA violations on the debt collector’s behalf.176 
Third, a narrow reading of Section 1692e also permits debt collectors to 
abuse consumers by exploiting the misrepresentation exception,177 
effectively undercutting the spirit of Heintz.178 As described in the previous 
hypothetical situation, a debt collector would be free to deceive his attorney 
in order to make a misleading representation to the court with relation to 
litigation to recover a debt. This type of situation is very possible given the 
reactions of the judges in both Hartman and O’Rourke when consumers 
brought civil actions against a third party debt collector for violations of 
Section 1692e for in-court misrepresentations. Such an abuse by a debt 
collector of a third party (attorney) privilege is precisely the type of 
misconduct that the FDCPA and Section 1692e were enacted to 
proscribe.179 Thus, by restricting the scope of Section 1692e to the narrow 
definition of “communications directed at consumers” held by the Seventh 
Circuit,180 debt collectors are still able to use some sort of deception in 
                                                                                                                                          
 172. The first section of the FDCPA states that “[t]here is abundant evidence of the use of 
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 173. See Heintz v. Jenkins, 514 U.S. 291, 298 (1995). 
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relation to the collection of a debt. This is hardly the call of the FDCPA as 
it prohibits the use of “any false, deceptive, or misleading representation” 
by debt collectors.181 
3. The Small Section’s Small Impact on Debt Collectors 
It is important to note that broadly interpreting Section 1692e should 
not significantly disadvantage debt collectors. The FDCPA’s goal is to 
protect consumers while ensuring “that those debt collectors who refrain 
from using abusive debt collection practices are not competitively 
disadvantaged.”182 Allowing a broad interpretation of Section 1692e would 
not remove tools available to debt collectors that they would otherwise have 
been permitted to use by law. Submitting misleading documents to a court 
was not permissible before the enactment of Section 1692e, and is still 
impermissible apart from Section 1692e under provisions such as Rule 
11.183 Broad coverage does not turn a permissible practice into an illegal 
one. A lie to the court is still a lie, even if consumers do not have standing 
to sue under Section 1692e for that lie. Instead, a broad scope will allow 
consumers to enforce their own rights where a judge and the CFPB might 
not. As the proposed changes to the interpretation of Section 1692e do not 
interfere with the legal rights of debt collectors, debt collectors will likely 
only suffer the disadvantage of more strictly enforced pre-existing rules of 
ethical conduct. By allowing consumers to regulate debt collectors, those 
who refrain from unfair collection practices will gain a competitive 
advantage over their counterparts who have carried on unchecked by the 
courts. 
IV. DODD-FRANK AND SECTION 1692e—SUGGESTIONS FOR 
THE CFPB 
This section focuses on the effect that the Dodd-Frank Act has and 
should have on the enforcement of Section 1692e. Enacted July 21, 2010, 
the Dodd-Frank Act transferred enforcement and regulatory powers over 
the FDCPA from the FTC to the CFPB.184 The CFPB is charged with 
“regulat[ing] the offering and provision of consumer financial products or 
services under the Federal consumer financial laws,”185 and focuses on 
educating consumers and “[r]estrict[ing] unfair, deceptive, or abusive [debt 
                                                                                                                                          
 181. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. 
 182. Id. § 1692(e).  
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 184. See Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1089, 124 Stat. 1376, 2092 (2010) (codified 
at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1692k, 1692m, 1692o). 
 185. Id. § 1011(a), 124 Stat. at 1964 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5491).  
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collection] acts or practices.”186 As such, the CFPB is charged with the 
responsibility of interpreting the FDCPA.187 
On the whole, the CFPB will have the same level of discretion and 
regulatory power as the FTC. However, the significance in transferring 
power to the CFPB is two-fold. First, the CFPB is a specialized office that 
represents a consolidation of consumer financial protection authorities that 
had been originally scattered across several federal agencies.188 Second, the 
CFPB has rulemaking authority over federal consumer financial laws, 
which must be given deferential treatment by the courts.189 This great 
deference given to rules enacted by the CFPB strategically positions it to 
bring considerable and effective change to consumer protection laws like 
the FDCPA. 
In 2011, the FTC has taken “significant steps” in its regulation of 
abusive debt collection practices.190 Additionally, the CFPB “is currently 
conducting nonpublic investigations of debt collection practices to 
determine whether they violate the FDCPA or Dodd-Frank Act.”191 The 
CFPB has filed several amicus briefs also addressing abusive debt 
collection practices.192 However, Section 1692e has yet to be addressed by 
either the FTC or CFPB. With that in mind, the following are suggested 
actions that the CFPB take going forward. 
 A. CLEARLY DEFINE THE SCOPE OF SECTION 1692e 
First, the CFPB should clarify vague definitions in the FDCPA. Title X 
of the Dodd-Frank Act gives the CFPB deferential oversight in interpreting 
laws such as the FDCPA: 
[T]he deference that a court affords to the [CFPB] with respect to a 
determination . . . regarding the meaning or interpretation of any provision 
of a Federal consumer financial law shall be applied as if the [CFPB] were 
the only agency authorized to apply, enforce, interpret, or administer the 
provisions of such . . . law.193 
The CFPB is clearly the appropriate department to make such 
determinations, and by doing so, the CFPB would settle many disputes 
among the courts as to how to interpret sections of the FDCPA. 
In the case of misrepresentations made by debt collectors, the scope of 
Section 1692e could be easily settled with an enumerated list of parties 
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subject to that subsection. This would solve any issues a court may have in 
interpreting what “in connection with the collection of any debt”194 actually 
means. Additionally, clearer definitions will provide debt collectors with 
boundaries and consumers with a better understanding of their rights, 
ultimately saving both parties from unnecessary or inequitable litigation.195 
While there is an argument to be made that ambiguity in a legal context 
has a valuable deterrent effect,196 Section 1692e is not one of those 
contexts. Ambiguity is useful when it spurs a potential violator to engage in 
a cost-benefit analysis that results in a choice to err on the side of caution 
by acting conservatively.197 For example, the ambiguity of not knowing 
whether a police officer has set up a speed trap around the bend is effective 
when it causes the driver to slow down just to be safe. However, a look at 
cases like O’Rourke and Hartman suggest that such a deterrent effect does 
not exist with regard to Section 1692e violations. Deterrence would be 
realized if the ambiguity in application of Section 1692e led debt collectors 
to refrain from submitting misleading documents to state courts. 
The very existence of cases like O’Rourke and Hartman demonstrate 
the exact opposite—that debt collectors are attempting to take advantage of 
this ambiguity. Further, even if debt collectors decided to play it safe and 
refrain from abusing Section 1692e, the effect would be the same as the 
CFPB clearly defining the scope of Section 1692e. Therefore, in order to 
protect consumers from repeat occurrences of cases like O’Rourke and 
Hartman, and to provide debt collectors with unequivocal guidelines, the 
CFPB should clearly define Section 1692e. 
B. ENACT A MORE DETAILED COMPLAINT RECORDING SYSTEM 
Second, the CFPB should employ a more detailed complaint recording 
system. While the current categories are useful, there is no category that 
accounts for misrepresentations that might violate Section 1692e.198 In 
order to better understand the issue of misrepresentations made to third 
parties, the CFPB should add a misrepresentation category to the types of 
complaints received and reported each year.199 Further, the 
misrepresentation category should include a detailed description of the 
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types of misrepresentations that are made (e.g., statements and documents 
submitted to a court, to an unrelated person, to an attorney, and directly to 
consumers). Because it is not clear how often Section 1692e violations 
occur in court settings, a more detailed recording of debt collection 
complaints will enable the CFPB to identify the frequency of such 
instances. After all, the CFPB cannot address consumer debt problems 
without understanding the extent of those problems.200 
C. REQUIRE TRANSFER OF PROPER DOCUMENTATION 
Last, the CFPB should make debt collection suits simpler by requiring 
that third party debt collectors procure and maintain all documents 
necessary to successfully bring a debt collection suit when purchasing debt 
from an original creditor. Doing so would ensure that even before bringing 
a suit to recover a debt, debt collectors are equipped with the necessary and 
proper documentation to bring a suit. Having such documentation should 
significantly reduce the instances of document misrepresentation either to a 
court through pleadings or directly to a consumer. 
While the Association of Credit and Collection Professionals (ACA) 
has suggested that the CFPB require original creditors to retain all 
necessary documents for a debt recovery suit,201 it would be more effective 
if the CFPB mandated a transfer of all necessary documents to a third party 
debt collector when the debt is sold. A creditor who has sold a debt has 
little incentive to maintain that account’s information as he has already been 
paid for the debt and may no longer collect on it. It is also burdensome to 
effectively maintain this data, as the statute of limitations to bring suit for a 
debt generally ranges from three to ten years.202 This would require that an 
original creditor maintain access to individual account data potentially for 
an entire decade even though it has already turned over that account to a 
third party debt collector. On the other hand, debt collectors have a great 
incentive to maintain this information because their profits depend on the 
successful collection of purchased debt,203 either inside or outside of court. 
Therefore, the burden should rest on debt collectors to procure and maintain 
this data. 
Currently, when a debt is sold, necessary and relevant consumer and 
account data are not always made fully available to the purchasing debt 
collector, leading to later debt verification problems.204 This is because it 
may be impractical and costly to transfer vast amounts of data and because 
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there is no requirement that original creditors provide this information to 
purchasers.205 Additionally, because the CFPB is focusing on educating 
consumers about their debt collection rights,206 there may be a future 
increase in instances of consumers challenging debt collectors for proper 
verification of debts. While it may be initially burdensome for debt 
collectors to procure and maintain proper documentation, it will be 
beneficial in the future as the demand to provide accurate documentation 
for debt collection suits becomes more frequent. 
CONCLUSION 
The purpose of the FDCPA is to “eliminate abusive debt collection 
practices by many debt collectors” in light of “abundant evidence of the use 
of abusive, deceptive, and unfair debt collection practices.”207 To better 
protect consumers, Section 1692e should be interpreted to give consumers a 
private cause of action against debt collectors for misstatements made in 
pleadings and other documents submitted to a court of law. Currently, that 
interpretation is unclear after O’Rourke and Hartman.208 
The Supreme Court will have to eventually define the scope of Section 
1692e. As Justice Tinder stated in his dissent in O’Rourke, the Seventh 
Circuit’s decision to exclude misrepresentations made in pleadings from the 
scope of Section 1692e has put the Seventh and Sixth Circuits “at 
loggerheads.”209 This difference in opinion between the Sixth and Seventh 
Circuits as to what constitutes a “communication” to a consumer should be 
settled in favor of consumers. This means a broader interpretation based on 
trends in circuit decisions, the purpose and wording of the FDCPA, and the 
potential for abuse by debt collectors under a narrow application. 
While consumers should be allowed to protect their rights under 
Section 1692e, the CFPB also has an important role to play in protecting 
consumers from unscrupulous debt collection practices. By using its 
regulatory powers to define Section 1692e,210 by gathering more accurate 
data on specific types of debt collector abuses,211 and by requiring a more 
stringent document transfer process when selling debt,212 the CFPB could 
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also effectively address the increasing problem of deceptive debt collection 
practices.213 
A misstatement can be made inside or outside of the courtroom. In the 
case of third party debt collection, either type of deception has the potential 
to harm consumers by misleading either the consumer or the judge. 
However, it is not clear why the FDCPA—a body of law meant to be 
enforced by consumers214—should not apply to all aspects of debt 
collection. Hopefully Section 1692e will be interpreted by the Supreme 
Court and the CFPB in a way that extends its protective scope into the 
courtroom. 
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